Abstract. In this paper we examine the hard problems underlying asymmetric pairings, their precise relationships and how they affect a number of existing protocols. Furthermore, we present a new model for the elliptic curve groups used in asymmetric pairings, which allows both an efficient pairing and an efficiently computable isomorphism.
Introduction
In recent years we have seen the advent of various protocols based on pairings. However, much of the literature uses a confusing array of underlying hard problems and differing notation. This is because the original protocols were defined in the context of pairings on supersingular curves, in which the pairing is between a group and itself, i.e.
G × G −→ G T .
In later papers the emphasis has been on so-called asymmetric pairings, where the pairing is from two (possibly) different groups into a third, i.e.
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As a result, it is hard to reconcile one paper against another and in addition, the area is further confused by various authors insisting on a computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 .
In this paper we elaborate on these differences in greater detail. We carefully point out what are the underlying hard problems and how they are related. In addition we point out the reliance on the computability of the isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . In many protocols the isomorphism is only needed to exist so as to define the protocol, and an isomorphism between two finite cyclic groups of the same order clearly exists a priori. The issue with whether the isomorphism is computable often only becomes important in the security proof. However, in such cases one could model the security proof with respect to a relativised result whereby the adversary has access to an oracle that computes this isomorphism.
The reason these considerations matter is that given standard representations in the literature for G 2 and G 1 it is impossible to have both a simultaneously efficient pairing and a computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . The only notable exception being supersingular curves with distortion map; however, we will mainly focus on ordinary curves. In this paper we also present a new model for G 2 which enables an efficiently computable pairing, a computable isomorphism on ordinary curves plus gives a reduced bandwidth representation. The only draw back with our model for G 2 is that it appears difficult to construct efficient hash functions with codomain equal to G 2 .
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we examine the underlying hard problems in asymmetric pairings and examine their relationships and how they affect a number of existing protocols. This section is presented completely in the abstract with no mention of elliptic curves. In Section 3 we present the main ideas we require from the theory of pairings on elliptic curves. We summarise a number of known implementation issues and discuss some problems. In Section 4 we present our model of the group G 2 which allows both an efficient pairing and an efficient isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . The big advantage of our solution is that it is more memory efficient and that the trace and pairing operations are simpler since they essentially "come for free". In Section 5 we compare our model with other models of G 2 and we end with some other possible representations of G 2 . Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
We would like to thank Steven Galbraith for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Abstract Pairing Based Protocols
In this section we examine a number of pairing based protocols and point out some interesting observations which motivate the work in this paper. To emphasise the points we wish to make more clear, we present our arguments and observations completely abstract, without reference to any underlying concrete groups. Then in later sections when we specialise to elliptic curve groups one can more easily see how the problems discussed in this section apply to elliptic curve groups.
We first need to define an overall problem instance on which to base our pairing based protocols. We define a pairing problem instance to be a tuple Γ = (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 ,p) where G 1 , G 2 and G T denote groups of prime order q. For convenience we shall write G 1 and G 2 additively and G T multiplicatively. We let P 1 and P 2 denote two fixed generators of G 1 and G 2 respectively. Our pairing problem instance also contains a computable bilinear pairinĝ
We denote the pairing byp, to stress that in this section we are dealing with an abstract pairing. In future sections we shall use the notationt when dealing with the concrete Tate pairing; in this case the groups G 1 and G 2 become subgroups of elliptic curves and G T is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field.
Since G 1 and G 2 have the same prime group order there clearly is a group isomorphism ϕ between G 2 and G 1 such that ϕ(P 2 ) = P 1 . In this section we make no assumption as to whether ϕ, or ϕ −1 , is efficiently computable. We shall call one of our groups G i , for either i = 1 or i = 2, randomly samplable if it is possible to simply write down a random element of the group, without necessarily computing rP i for some random value of r. This notion will become important in later sections when analysing our pairing based protocols. In particular if a group is not randomly samplable then the only way one can produce new elements within a protocol is by computing rP i for some value of r.
Given a pairing problem instance one can define a number of variations of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem, as follows
Given a pairing problem instance Γ = (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 ,p) and values i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we define the BDH i,j,k problem to be the following: Given aP i , bP j and cP k , with a, b, c ∈ F q , we are asked to computep(P 1 , P 2 )
abc . The advantage of any adversary A against this problem is defined to be
Definition 2 (The coBDH j,k Problem). Given a pairing problem instance Γ = (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 ,p) and values j, k ∈ {1, 2} we define the coBDH j,k problem to be the following: Given aP 1 , aP 2 , bP j and cP k , with a, b, c ∈ F q , we are asked to computep(P 1 , P 2 )
Definition 3 (The BDH ϕ i,j,k Problem). The BDH ϕ i,j,k problem is the same as the BDH i,j,k problem, with the only difference that the adversary now has access to an oracle which computes values under the isomorphism ϕ mentioned above, but does not necessarily have access to an oracle which computes the inverse isomorphism ϕ −1 . Again the advantage is defined to be
There are clearly relationships between these problems:
-The problems BDH i,j,k and BDH i ,j ,k are polynomial time equivalent if i + j + k = i + j + k , the same holds for the problems BDH problem is possibly harder than the BDH ϕ 2,2,2 problem. -On the other hand the problems BDH i,j,k and BDH i ,j ,k do not appear to be related when i + j + k = i + j + k . -An efficient algorithm to solve BDH i,j,k implies an efficient algorithm to solve BDH ϕ i,j,k , but the converse is only true when the map ϕ exists and is not just provided as an oracle.
-An efficient algorithm to solve BDH i,j,k implies an efficient algorithm to solve coBDH j,k and an efficient algorithm to solve coBDH j,k implies an efficient algorithm to solve BDH ϕ 2,j,k . -Finally, we also remark that an efficient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem in either group G 1 , G 2 , G T , implies an efficient algorithm to solve all the above problems.
We can also define variations of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
) and values i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we define the CDH i,j,k problem to be the following: Given aP i and bP j , with a, b ∈ F q , we are asked to compute abP k . The advantage of any adversary A against this problem is defined to be
A variant CDH ϕ i,j,k of this problem can be defined similarly to above, as can similar relations between the problems. In addition we see that an efficient algorithm to solve CDH i,j,k can be used to solve the BDH i,j,k , problem when k = k .
Decisional variants of the above problems can also be defined, as can then the resulting gap problems (i.e. the above computational problems relative to an oracle which solves the equivalent decisional problem). Note, however that certain decisional problems are easy, for example the decision variant of CDH i,j,k with i = j is simple since one can use the pairing to test for a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.
We shall now turn to discussing what these concepts imply for a number of pairing based cryptosystems.
The Boneh-Franklin Encryption Scheme
Here we discuss the Boneh-Franklin ID-based encryption scheme [3] in the context of our abstract pairings above. We assume the reader is familiar with the scheme and so only recap on the salient points for which we need do define notation.
Given a pairing problem instance Γ = (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 ,p) the BonehFranklin scheme requires the following four elements of the groups G 1 and G 2 to be defined.
1. The public key of the trust authority is defined to be R = xP i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, and some secret value x ∈ F q . 2. The public key of the user is defined to be Q ID = H(ID) ∈ G j , where j ∈ {1, 2} and H is a cryptographic hash function from {0, 1} * to G j . 3. The ephemeral key in the ciphertext is given by U = rP k , for k ∈ {1, 2}, and some ephemeral secret value r ∈ F q . 4. The secret key of the user S ID ∈ G l , for l ∈ {1, 2}, must satisfy either
From this set up we can instantly notice a number of points:
-Due to point 2 the group G j must be randomly samplable, otherwise one would never be able to implement such a hash function. -Due to point 4 we must have either l = j, or if there is an oracle to compute ϕ we may also have (j, l) = (2, 1). -The encryptor needs to compute the pairing of either Q ID and R, or Q ID and ϕ(R), or ϕ(Q ID ) and R. This implies that either i = j, or if there is an oracle to compute ϕ we may also have i = j = 2. -The decryptor needs to compute the pairing of either S ID and U , or S ID and ϕ(U ), or ϕ(S ID ) and U . This implies that either k = l, or if there is an oracle to compute ϕ we may also have k = l = 2.
Since to implement any scheme requiring an oracle for ϕ, we need not just an oracle, but an actual efficient and explicit algorithm, this implies the following: If ϕ is not efficiently computable then to implement the Boneh-Franklin scheme one requires either (i, j, k, l) = (1, 2, 1, 2) or (2, 1, 2, 1). However, if ϕ is efficiently computable then one can have any one of the following tuples for (i, j, k, l) (2, 2, 2, 2), (1, 2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1, 2)(2, 2, 2, 1), (1, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2, 1).
Subject to the constraint that the group G j is randomly samplable.
If we now turn to the proof of the Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme, in particular the proofs of Lemma 4.2 and 4.6 of [3] , and extending them to the more general situation of G 1 = G 2 as considered in our work, we see that the hash function H is modelled as a random oracle via the following simulation: For any identity ID t the random oracle H is computed via Q IDt = b t P j , for some random b t , with the corresponding values of S IDt computed via b t R, or ϕ(b t R). This implies that either i = j, or ϕ is available via oracle access to the adversary and i = 2 and j = 1.
Hence, the existing security proof of the Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme implies that:
-If ϕ is not efficiently computable then one needs to select (i, j, k, l) = (2, 1, 2, 1) and the security proof of the scheme is relative to the hardness of the BDH
problem. In other words, although the scheme in this instance may not require an efficiently computable ϕ the security proof is relative to an adversary which has oracle access to ϕ. Hence, if one is unwilling to accept such a relativised security result then one has to revert to basing ones security on the coBDH 1,2 problem, as pointed out by [3] . However, the coBDH 1,2 problem is also somewhat unnatural. -If ϕ is effectively computable then one needs to select (i, j, k, l) from one of the following (2, 2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2, 1).
The security proof is then relative to the hardness of BDH ϕ i,j,k , except that now ϕ is not only given as oracle access to the adversary, but is actually computable. Hence, the hardness is relative to the standard BDH i,j,k problem. Given our comments on the relative hardness of these problems earlier, one should probably choose (i, j, k, l) = (2, 2, 1, 2) or (2, 1, 2, 1).
Hence, if one wishes to have a scheme which is both provably secure and for which the security is related to a well studied problem, i.e. the BDH i,j,k problem, then one needs to use a pairing for which there is an efficiently computable isomorphism.
The Boneh-Lynn-Shacham Signature Scheme
This section contains a similar analysis of the BLS short signature scheme [4] in the context of our abstract pairings above.
Given a pairing problem instance Γ = (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , P 1 , P 2 ,p) the BLS requires the following three elements of the groups G 1 and G 2 to be defined.
1. The public key of the user is defined to be R = xP i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, and some secret value x ∈ F q . 2. The hash of a message is defined to be Q M = H(M) ∈ G j , where j ∈ {1, 2} and H is a cryptographic hash function from {0, 1} * to G j . 3. The signature is given S ∈ G k , where either S = xQ M or S = ϕ(xQ M ).
From this set up we can instantly notice a number of points: -Due to point 2 the group G j must be randomly samplable, otherwise one would never be able to implement such a hash function. -Due to point 3 we must have either j = k, or if there is an oracle to compute ϕ we may also have (j, k) = (2, 1). -To verify a signature we need to compute two pairings:
• We need to compute the pairing of either either Q M and R, or Q M and ϕ(R), or ϕ(Q M ) and R. This implies that either i = j, or if there is an oracle to compute ϕ we may also have i = j = 2.
• We also need to compute the pairing of either S and P i , or S and ϕ(P i ), or ϕ(S) and P i . This implies that either k = i, or if there is an oracle to compute ϕ we may also have i = k = 2.
This implies the following: If ϕ is not efficiently computable then to implement the BLS scheme one requires either (i, j, k) = (1, 2, 2) or (2, 1, 1). However, if ϕ is efficiently computable then one can have any one of the following tuples for (i, j, k) (1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2).
Subject to the constraint that the group G j is randomly samplable. We now turn to the proof of the BLS signature scheme, in particular the simulation in Game 1 of the security proof. The simulation of the hash function H works in roughly the same way as the simulation in the proof of the Boneh 
-If ϕ is not efficiently computable then one needs to select (i, j, k) = (2, 1, 1) and the security proof of the scheme is relative to the hardness of the CDH
problem. In other words, although the scheme in this instance may not require an efficiently computable ϕ the security proof is relative to an adversary which has oracle access to ϕ. -If ϕ is effectively computable then one needs to select (i, j, k) from one of the following (2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2).
The security proof is then relative to the hardness of CDH ϕ i,j,k , except that now ϕ is not only given as oracle access to the adversary it is actually computable, hence the hardness is relative to the standard CDH i,j,k problem.
Other Protocols
We now discuss a number of other protocols. Our list is not exhaustive and we point out just a number of problems.
In Boneh, Boyen and Shacham's paper [2] on short group signatures the authors present a group signature scheme in a pairing problem instance Γ . The main protocol is based on very different assumptions to those presented here, but the security proof relies on an adversary with access to the isomorphism ϕ. However, as an aside the authors of [2] present a simplified scheme which is based on a decisional variant of the CDH 1,1,1 problem. However, for this problem to be hard the map ϕ −1 must be hard to compute. In general it does appear that ϕ −1 is hard to compute for all examples where one knows how to compute ϕ efficiently, except again for supersingular curves with distortion map.
In Boneh and Shacham's paper [5] on group signatures with verifier-local revocation one needs an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 so as to be able to implement the scheme. Of all the papers which present their protocols in the asymmetric pairing setting, this is the only one we could find which actually required a computable isomorphism to be able to implement the protocol. This is not to say that one of the protocols described in the symmetric pairing setting in the literature when generalised to the asymmetric setting will not require a computable isomorphism. However, there is a problem with implementing the scheme of [5] in our context below. The scheme also requires a hash function with domain equal to G 2 , which appears hard to construct for our representation of G 2 given in Section 4.
Pairings on Elliptic Curves
We now turn to actual concrete pairings based on (ordinary) elliptic curves. We assume that our elliptic curves are defined over a field F p of characteristic greater than three. To aid computational efficiency we choose curves which have equations of the form E :
where b ∈ F p . We assume that #E(F p ) is divisible by a large prime q and that there is a small integer k such that q divides p k − 1, but q does not divide p l − 1 for any integer l < k. Such curves are often called MNT curves as an algorithm for their construction was first given in [6] .
Given such a curve the points of order q, i.e. the group E[q], are defined over F p k and they form a two dimensional vector space over F q . As a basis of this vector space we can take P 1 and P 2 where P 1 is a point of order q in E(F p ) and P 2 is a point of order q which is defined over F p k but not F p .
The modified Tate pairingt is a bilinear pairing operating on the groupŝ
The pairing is such thatt(P, P ) = 1 for all P in E[q]; indeed, the pairing is trivial for all pairs which are linearly dependent when projected to the vector space E[q]. It is therefore common to restrict the first component to the points of order q in E(F p ) and the second component to a subgroup of E(F p k ) which is linearly independent of the points of order q in E(F p ). The question arises as to which subgroup should be chosen for the second component.
As mentioned earlier a number of protocols require a pairing for which there is a computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . In this situation the natural choice for G 1 is to be equal to E(F p )[q] and the natural isomorphism from a subgroup of E(F p k ) to E(F p ) is given by the trace map
However, if G 2 is a subgroup of E(F p k ) of order divisible by q which is distinct from G 1 , then it appears difficult to construct a hash function with codomain G 2 . Clearly by generating a random point of E(F p k ) and then multiplying by the cofactor #E(F p k )/q we will obtain a random element of E[q]. But the probability of this random element in E[q] lying in the chosen subgroup G 2 is 1/q. We first present an optimisation trick for computing the pairing already described in [1] . If k is even, i.e. k = 2d, then we let χ denote an element of F p d which is a quadratic non-residue, i.e. we have
If we let d be odd then one can select χ ∈ F p , which means that multiplication and division by χ can be performed in linear time.
We can now consider the quadratic twist of E over the field F p d given by
Notice, we use this form of the quadratic twist of the curve rather than the form used in [1] so as to enable standard tricks to efficiently compute the group law on E (F p d ).
There is an injective group homomorphism
Using a standard implementation trick, see [1] , the Tate pairing of an element P ∈ E(F p ) with an element Q ∈ Im(Φ) can be computed more efficiently than the pairing on an arbitrary element of E(
We note that since k is the smallest integer such that p k − 1 is divisible by q we see that p d + 1 must be divisible by q. However, on noticing that
and that N d is also divisible by q, we see that N d is also divisible by q. In particular we see that E (F p d ) contains a subgroup of order q. We let this subgroup be generated by P 2 . Hence, Φ(P 2 ) is a subgroup of order q of E(F p k ) which is linear independent of the subgroup generated by P 1 . Since in this paper G 1 will always be given by P 1 , we shall denote Φ(P 2 ) by G ⊥ 1 . If we pair an element of G 1 with an element of E(F p k ) with x-coordinate in F p d then our pairing computation can be performed efficiently [1] . The following lemma shows that there is essentially only one such subgroup G 2 . Lemma 1. The only subgroups of E(F p k ) of order q which consist of elements with x-coordinates contained in F p d are given by G 1 and G ⊥ 1 . Proof : Let G be such a subgroup and let P = (x, y) be a generator, then clearly all elements in G will have x-coordinate in F p d if and only if P does. If we set
The element P 1 is contained in G 1 and P ⊥ 1 is contained in G On the other hand, it is easy to see that Tr(P ) = O for all elements P ∈ G ⊥ 1 . Hence, if we select G 2 = G ⊥ 1 then there does not exist a natural computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , no matter what choice of P 1 is made. However, as our earlier analysis points out, if no such computable isomorphism exists then either various pairing based schemes are not provably secure, or are provably secure relative to a new assumption (namely the adversary has access to an oracle to evaluate the isomorphism), in other cases the protocol simply cannot be computed without access to a computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 .
Efficient Pairings and Computable Isomorphisms
In this section we present a new model for G 2 which allows us to achieve both an efficient pairing computation, plus an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . However, this comes at the expense of G 2 not being randomly samplable. Thus, due to our discussion in an earlier section this restricts slightly the role of G 1 and G 2 in various protocols, in particular it will be impossible to construct hash functions with codomain equal to G 2 . In this section we keep the elliptic curve notation of the previous section.
In setting up our system we define G 1 = P 1 as before. We then set
This implies that Tr(P 1 ) = kP 1 = P 1 .
Our group G 2 we represent as the cyclic subgroup of E(F p ) × E (F p d ) generated by (P 1 , P 2 ) where P 2 is an element of E (F p d ) of order q, as in the previous section. We shall denote this choice of G 2 byĜ 2 . First we note that it appears impossible to construct a cryptographic hash function with codomain equal toĜ 2 , or to generate elements at random fromĜ 2 without creating a multiple of the generator, since it appears hard to generate completely at random two elements from different groups which have the same discrete logarithm with respect to the group generators without also computing the discrete logarithm.
However, it is easy to detect whether a pair (Q 1 , Q 2 ) is actually an element ofĜ 2 , given that Q 1 ∈ E(F p ) and Q 2 ∈ E (F p d ). If (Q 1 , Q 2 ) ∈Ĝ 2 then there is an x ∈ F q such that Q 1 = xP 1 and Q 2 = xP 2 . Hence, checking for inclusion in G 2 comes down to testing whether
Note that these two Tate pairings are easy to compute since the second coordinate lies in the image of Φ and so the tricks of [1] can be applied.
We let the pairing of elements of G 1 andĜ 2 be denoted byp, and the isomorphism fromĜ 2 to G 1 be denoted by φ. We also define an injective homomorphism fromĜ 2 to E(F p k ) defined by
We define for P ∈ G 1 and Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 ) ∈Ĝ 2 that
The last equality follows since Q 1 is linearly dependent on P , so we can simply setp(P, Q) =t(P, Φ(Q 2 )). We note that since the second coordinate of the Tate pairing is in the image of Φ that the pairingp(·, ·) can be computed efficiently.
We also note that all the properties of a pairing in cryptography are satisfied by our pairingp(·, ·).
To define the isomorphism fromĜ 2 to G 1 we use the trace map as in the previous section, which gives:
This follows since the image of Φ always has trace zero and since Q 1 is in E(F p ) its trace is easily calculated by taking the kth multiple of Q 1 . As another alternative one could take φ(Q) = Q 1 . Hence, with this representation G 2 =Ĝ 2 , we achieve both an efficiently computable pairing and an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 .
Comparison
In this section we return to the Boneh-Franklin encryption scheme; a similar analysis applies to the other schemes mentioned earlier. We wish to explain the effect of the different choices for G 2 , namely G ⊥ 1 andĜ 2 and a general G 2 . A general G 2 , by which we mean an arbitrary subgroup of order q of E(F q 2d ) which is not equal to G ⊥ 1 we shall denote by G 2 . The pairing can be computed in an efficient manner by using the following trick from [7] p(P, Q) =t(P, Q − σ(Q)) where σ is the q d -power Frobenius automorphism. Note, that the point Q−σ(Q) has x-coordinate in F q d and so the pairing can be computed efficiently.
We summarise the main computational and bandwidth considerations in Table 1. Bandwidth, i.e. the size of elements of G 2 , is measured in multiples of log 2 p. We recall that when we have a computable isomorphism the BDH i,j,k problem is equivalent to the BDH ϕ i,j,k problem. Note, by reducing the hardness in the last two cases to BDH 2,2,1 rather than BDH 2,1,2 we can select ciphertext sizes which are smaller, i.e. k = 1 in our previous discussion of Section 2.1. However, this would require a mechanism to hash into the group G 2 , which appears impossible. Hence, it is only practical to reduce the security to BDH 2,1,2 which implies that ciphertexts are larger.
Another choice of G 2
One can obtain a group for G 2 which has both a computable homomorphism to G 1 , efficient pairings and for which one can derive a hash function with codomain equal to G 2 . However, one now has to select a group which is not cyclic of order q, but has exponent q.
It is easy to construct hash functions from an arbitrary bit string to both G 1 and G ⊥ 1 . As G 2 we now select the subgroup of G 1 × E (F p d ) of order q 2 and exponent q. There are two ways to represent elements of G 2 which give performance improvements.
1. In the first method we hold elements in G 2 as the pair of elements (Q 1 , Q 2 )
where Q 1 ∈ G 1 and Q 2 ∈ E (F p d ) where Q 2 is of order q. Representing Q in this way require roughly (d + 1) log 2 p bits. Hashing into G 2 is now (theoretically) trivial, and computing the homomorphism to G 1 is obtained via φ((Q 1 , Q 2 )) = Tr(Q 1 + Φ(Q 2 )) = kQ 1 or φ((Q 1 , Q 2 )) = Q 1 .
The pairing is also computed in a similar way viâ p(P, (Q 1 , Q 2 )) =t(P, Q 1 + Φ(Q 2 )) =t(P, Φ(Q 2 )).
2. In the second method we hold elements in G 2 as a point Q ∈ E(F q k ), where Q has order q. Representing Q in this way requires roughly 2d log 2 p bits. Hashing into G 2 is now (theoretically) trivial, and computing the homomorphism to G 1 is obtained via φ(Q) = Tr(Q). The pairing can be computed in an efficient manner using the previous trick we presented for the group G 2 .
In both cases hashing is performed by generating an element at random on the appropriate curve (using a standard construction from a cryptographic hash function) followed by multiplication by the appropriate cofactor. This is rather an expensive operation in both cases. The cofactor in the first case has size roughly p d /q, whilst in the second case the cofactor has size roughly p k /q = p 2d /q. Hence, hashing into G 2 may become a computational bottleneck of any scheme.
In addition, the security proofs and protocols may now need to be slightly altered as almost all security proofs are written on the assumption that G 2 is cyclic of order q. Another problem is that there is a small probability, namely 1−1/q, that the pairing of a non-trivial element of G 1 with a non-trivial element of G 2 may result in a trivial value for the pairing. This eventuality will also need to be considered in the various protocols which require pairings. We do not discuss these two issues further except to point out that for all protocols we have looked at such problems can be easily fixed with this choice of G 2 .
Conclusion
We have described the various hard problems that occur in the asymmetric pairing setting and some of the relationships between them. In particular we have seen how the precise proof techniques used in pairing protocols can have subtle implications for the nature of the underlying hard problem in the asymmetric setting. This is particularly the case in relation to the existence of a computable isomorphism from the second to the first group.
We have also elaborated on efficient representations for the second group in the asymmetric setting which try to address some of the issues presented in the first part of the paper. However, the choice for the second group raises one of the following problems: it either affects whether one can implement certain protocols, whether the protocol is efficient and whether it has a security proof relative to a standard, non-relativised, problem. We hope our paper provides an impetus to researchers to find sets of pairing parameters which do not have these problems.
